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INTEREST ON THE BALANCES OF CHECKING
ACCOUNTS
If a promissory note payable to a solvent commercial bank made by
one not a customer were discounted for the maker by the bank and the
price though due were not demanded by the maker, the financial and
legal consequences would be those of a demand loan by maker to bank.
If bullion, coins, bank notes, or deposit currency were sold by one not a
customer to a bank and the price not demanded when due, the conse-
quences would be those of a demand loan. Similarly, if the discounted
note matured but were permitted by the bank to run, the 6ank would be
making a demand loan to the solvent maker. If the check of a third
person, representing deposit currency, were indorsed by one not a cus-
tomer to a bank and paid for before the check is dishonored, between
the time the indorser is subjected to a duty to pay, and his prompt pay-
ment, there would be a demand loan to him. If a bank honored the
"check" of one of its creditors who was not a customer, a demand loan
to the drawer would be the consequence. Though all these affairs were
transacted within a few days and between the same parties, each would,
subject to the qualifications required by permission to join separate
causes of action in the same action and by permission to plead counter-
claims and set-offs, have legal consequences independent of each of the
others. In each the legal duty of the borrower would be measured as to
amount by the amount of the particular advance.
Such transactions, the making and receipt of advances by way of
demand loan, are the business of the commercial bank. But the bulk of
the loans are to and from regular dealers or customers. Hence the
device of the current account. In anticipation of a series of advances
by one to the other, of which the number, amount, and date cannot be
foreseen, the commercial bank and the prospective customer come to
the understanding that if nothing to the contrary be agreed at the time
of each advance, the receipt of each advance shall indicate that the
borrower bargains to pay to the lender upon demand the difference be-
tween the sum of the advances by the one and the sum of the advances
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by the other, if the difference is in favor of the other; if not, that the
advance shall be set off against the difference in his favor. The bar-
gain is sanctioned on the one hand by not imposing on the borrower a
duty to repay the advance and, on the other, by subjecting him to a
liability to pay upon demand the difference if against him, or, if it is in
his favor, by extinguishing pro tanto his right to the pre-existing differ-
ence.
Not all advances between bank and customer become items of the
current account. Which advances enter into the account depends upon
the understanding when the account is opened, or the agreement, if any,
when the advance is made. From the point of view of the customer,
advances by the customer to the bank which enter into the current
account are credits; advances by the bank are debits. The difference is
the balance. When the sum of advances by customer to bank exceeds
the sum of advances by bank to customer, the current account shows a
credit balance; when the bank's advances exceed the customer's, a debit
balance.
The balance is thus the vector of the obligation to pay, indicating
its direction and measuring its amount. The balance performs two other
offices. If thre bank has promised to make advances to the customer by
honoring his orders, the amount up to which the bank is obligated is
agreed to be determined by reference to the balance as a gauge. If the
bank has promised to pay interest the agreed multiplicand, which is to
be multiplied by the agreed rate of interest, is fixed by reference to the
balance. The agreement to make advances may fix the amount of the
bank's liability at the credit balance, the credit balance plus or minus
a stipulated amount, or the debit balance plus a stipulated amount. In
respect of interest, similarly, the multiplicand may be the credit balance,
or the credit balance minus or plus an amount to be computed by agreed
rules. Saving the usury statutes, banking laws, and Clearing House
regulations,' the parties are permitted to agree upon the methods for
computing from the balance the amount up to which advances shall be
made and the amount upon which interest shall be paid.
It is clear that different considerations will control the making of
the agreement as to what advances shall be upon the current account
and effect its balance, the agreement as to how the liability of the bank
to make advances shall be gauged, and the agreement as to determining
the amount upon which interest shall be paid. For example, when the
customer deposits in the bank a check drawn on another bank, the
agreement may be either (1) that the bank shall take the check for
'Interest Ruling No. 5 of the New York Clearing House Association, quoted
infra, note 12, illustrates the strong tendency encouraging the use of the credit
balance as a gauge of the obligation to pay interest.
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
collection only, shall not purchase it but shall account for it or its pro-
ceeds; or (2) that the bank shall purchase the check and the customer
advance the price to the bank 'on current account, but, as in the case of
the "savings" account, with no promise whatever on the bank's part to
honor checks. Or, it may be agreed (3) that the bank, though taking
for collection, shall add to the balance all collections in computing the
amount up to which orders shall be honored. And finally, it is pos-
sible, though unlikely, for the agreement to be (4) that the bank shall
buy the check but shall not until collection include the customer's ad-
vance of the price on current account in computing the amount up to
which orders shall be honored. In the first form of agreement the
transaction results in no advance by either party; in the second, the
customer has made an advance which, furthermore, has become an
item of the current account; the third form of agreement presents the
case of a promise by the bank to honor orders exceeding in amount the
credit balance, i.e., a promise to honor "overdrafts"; the fourth illus-
trates an advance by the customer to the bank on the current account,
which does not affect the liability to honor orders. But whether or not
the bank has received an advance on account and comes under an obli-
gation to pay a larger balance, and whether or not it agrees to honor
orders at once, the bank will hesitate to pay interest on the amount of
the' check before collection, and ordinarily will not promise to do So.
2
Its habitual disinclination is understood and allowed for in interpreting
its promise to pay interest to a customer with a current account.
Again, suppose the agreement between bank and customer is that
the customer will advise the bank wheriever he has drawn an order on
it and that upon receipt of the advice the bank may thereafter refuse to
honor orders in excess of the credit balance minus the amount of the
advised draft. The advice is not an advance by either party and the
balance which the bank is under a liability to pay upon demand is not
affected. Nor are the funds at the disposal of the bank reduced. A
bank, therefore, is not privileged to reduce by the amount of the advised
draft the interest multiplicand.3  Receipt of the advice is unlike a cer-
' Interest Ruling No. 15 of the New York Clearing House Association ex-
pressly forbids the payment of interest on "uncollected items."
'Interviews and correspondence with leading New York bankers indicate
that banks usually do reduce the interest multiplicand upon receipt of the ad-
vice, and restore the deduction if the advice is cancelled, only as of the date of
cancellation, but that if pressed they restore also the interest lost by the cus-
tomer in the meantime. Under the circumstances, the legal relations of the
parties are not likely to be exactly defined. The only intimation of the judicial
attitude toward the question is a dictum in an unreported English nisi prius
case, in which Lord Justice Baggallay said "he should have hesitated much
before he gave effect to a practice which appeared to him to be both unreasonable
and unjust." See West of England Bank v. Evans, 1 PAGEr, LEGAL DECISIONS
AFFECTING BANKERS (1881) 20, 21.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tification. A certification, whether or not at the request of the drawer,
is an advance on account to the customer of a different form of com-
mercial bank credit, analogous to an advance in the form of the bank's
notes. Since the interest multiplicand is a function of the credit bal-
ance, the reduction of the latter reduces the former, and since there is no
promise in the certified check to pay interest either to drawer or holder,
there is, for reasons which will appear, no obligation to either. In the
case of the advice of drawing, the liability to honor the customer's
orders is affected, and a liability to the customer to honor the advised
order has arisen. But there is no other change in the legal relations
of the parties. This situation, therefore, illustrates another possibility
of variation between the amount of the balance, the amount up to which
orders should be honored, and the amount upon which interest should
be paid.
I
The principal motive of the customer who obtains the promise of
a bank to honor his checks and opens and maintains a current account
by the balance of which is to be gauged the bank's liability under its
promise, is to secure a supply of the common medium of exchange,
i.e., deposit currency in the checking account form. This the customer
has secured the moment the bank's promise is made and a sufficient
balance established. The bank's promise is the medium of exchange.
The performance of that promise by crediting the checking account of
the payee named in the customer's check, or by crediting the checking
account of a collecting bank employed by the payee, or by giving its
own check on its correspondent, is commonly thought of not as a per-
formance of a promise, but as a step in the transfer of the medium of
exchange. To the parties the transaction which takes place whenever
the customer makes an advance on the checking account appears as a
purchase rather than a loan. Partly for this reason, the vast majority
in number of checking accounts are not accompanied by a bargain for
the payment of interest by the bank.4 On the contrary, the time deposit
and the current account of the commercial bank with a ctistomer whose
checks it has not promised to honor, e.g., the "savings" account, are
usually accompanied by a promise to pay interest. These are bargains
in which the customer is seeking investment. Furthermore, they are
made with a view to payment or liquidation in the future; and in these
two important respects they differ from the bargain for the operation
of a checking account.
An express promise to pay interest on the credit balance of a check-
ing account is, then, exceptional. Nor is there a custom on the part of
" But see infra p. 639 and note 14.
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
banks to pay it upon which to support the finding of a promise in the
bargain.5
But each deposit is, as we have seen, an advance to the bank by
way of demand loan. In the case of loans is there not at least a pre-
sumption, created upon grounds of fairness perhaps, but stated in terms
of agreement, resulting in an obligation to pay interest? Are not most
loans of funds made with a view to profit and on the basis of the worth
of a dollar today being greater than that of a dollar tomorrow? How-
ever compelling these arguments for the presumption may be in the case
of other loans, 6 they have no force in the case of the advance to the
bank on the checking account. The customer though making a loan is
bargaining in terms appropriate to the purchase of deposit currency.
A duty to pay interest before default on a time loan of money, or
before demand on a*demand loan,7 is not imposed in our law apart from
a bargain for interest, or a presumption.8 A glimpse through the spec-
tacles of the early common lawyer, colored by the ecclesiastical ban on
all interest, will disclose why. The statute of 37 Henry VIII, c. 9, for-
bidding the taking of interest by agreement at more than ten per cent,
permitted for the first time, and then only by a negative implication, an
agreement for interest at a lesser rate. From all that has been said, it
is to be expected that a bank which has not expressly promised to pay
interest on the credit balance of a checking account is under no obliga-
tion to do so.9
'A promise to pay interest has been found in cases where a course of deal-
ing between the parties, Millar v. Craig, 6 Bear. 433 (1843), or a usage between
other parties similarly situated, Public Trustee v. Bank of New Zealand, 6 N. Z.
L. R. 680 (1888) ; People v. Merchants Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 41, 101 N. Y.Supp. 255 (1906), existed.
T e should be such a presumption. The following jurisdictions admit
one, Rodgers v. Clement, 162 N. Y. 422, 57 N. E. 1123 (1900); Woerz v. Schu-
meacher, 161 N. Y. 530, 56 N. E. 72 (1900) ; Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory,
3 Cowen 393 (N. Y. 1824), af'd, 5 Cowen 587 (N. Y. 1825); Liotard v. Graves,
3 Caines 225 (N. Y. 1805); Harris v. Mercur, 202 Pa. 318, 51 Atl. 971 (1902);
Dilworth v. Sinderling, 1 Binn. 488 (Pa. 1808); Hodges v. Hodges, 9 R. I. 32
(1868). In five states the presumption is created by statute, CALIF. Civ. CODE
(Deering, 1923) § 1914; MONT. REv. CODES (1921) § 7722; N. D. Comp. LAWS
ANN. (1913) §6069; OKLA. Comp. STAT. ANN. (1921) §5094; S. D. REy. CODE
(1919) § 1036; Seini-Tropic S. Ass'n v. Johnson, 163 Calif. 639, 126 Pac. 588
(1912); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Enright, 127 Calif. 669, 60 Pac. 439 (1900).
The presumption is of course rebuttable, Bell v. Rice, 50 Neb. 547, 70 N. W.
25 (1897) ; Hanley v. Crowe, 3 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1888). For the other view see
infra, p. 637 and note 8.
7rAfter default on a time loan, and after demand on a demand loan, interest
does run, as damages, 17 C. J. 818; English Civ. Prac. Act, 1833, 3 & 4 W. 4
c. 1, § 28; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1924) c. 74, § 2.
8 Calton v. Bragg, 15 East 223 (1812); Sammis v. Clark, 13111. 544 (1852)
semble; Hubbard v. Charlestown R. R., 52 Mass. 124 (1846); Chamberlain v.
Smith, 1 Mo. 718 (1827) ; 33 C. J. 734. Cf., supra note 6.
"Edwards v. Ware, 5 B. & Ad. 282 (1833) semble; First Nat. Bank v. Cole-
man, 11 II1. App. 508 (1882); Clark's Adm'r v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 124 Ky. 563,
90 S. W. 679 (1907); Parsons v. Treadwell, 50 N. H. 356 (1870) semble; Wain-
wright v. Marine Nat. Bank, 72 Pa. Super. 225 (1919).
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The time deposit and the current account not coupled with a prom-
ise to honor checks, since they do not create a form of deposit cur-
rency, are different. But the conclusion in respect of the obligation to
pay interest, reached in the case of the checking account, probably holds
good in these two cases as well, though for other reasons. .True, the
bargain between bank and customer is for a loan, but even in a jurisdic-
tion which presumes a promise to pay interest on a loan, the presump-
tion would probably be rebutted when it appeared that such bargains
between bank and customer almost universally stipulated expressly for
interest; in such a context, absence of an express stipulation is evidence
of a contrary intent.' 0
Up to this point the focus of discussion has been the credit balance.
But the credit balance is built up by a series of advances to the bank,
and the payment of interest on each advance might be the obligation of
the bank. The privilege or immunity of the bank not to pay interest onl
each advance may be accounted for not only by the factors already
observed, but also by the -fact that in case of advances on a current
account the bargain equivalent is not the promise of the bank to repay
the advance, but the promise to pay the credit balance. In making a
loan it is possible, as in the case of some perpetual annuities, to bargain
for interest to be computed on a multiplicand which is the amount ad-
vanced and not the amount to be repaid. But in the absence of an ex-
press promise, which is never made, the finding of such a bargain, or
the presumption of such an agreement is no more to be anticipated than
the finding of a promise to pay interest on the price prepaid under a
contract to sell.
II
As an outcome of the bargaining struggle, and still more of the
competitive struggle, banks do often promise to pay interest on the
credit balance of checking accounts. Since the rate of interest so
promised is usually less than the prevailing loan rate, the bank may
profitably pay interest to customers who maintain balances large and
steady enough to cover the overhead costs. The practice was much
more frequent before the establishment of the federal reserve system
than it has been since. At that time banks in reserve cities, vying with
each other for the business of the country banks and for the reserve
balances that went with that business, frequently promised to pay such
"0 Cf. cases of promissory notes on which interest is not allowed unless
stipulated. Time notes, Jefferis v. Mullen, 130 Atl. 39 (Del. 1925); Usefof v.
Herzenstein, 65 Misc. 45, 119 N. Y. Supp. 290 (1909); demand notes, Knight v.
Barnwell, 130 Atl. 736 (N. J. 1925); Van Vliet v. Kanter, 139 App. Div. 603,
124 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1910).
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS 639
high rates of interest as to make the whole transaction unprofitable,
and at times extremely dangerous." Clearing house associations at-
tempted to restrict the competition by fixing a maximum rate which
their members could pay.' 2 With the advent of the federal reserve
system, its compulsory reserve balances made it difficult for country
banks to maintain balances in other banks, and its clearing facilities
made the practice unnecessary.' 3 However, private clearing and cor-
respondent banking continues, -and so does the payment of interest on
the credit balance. Of course large customers other than banks can
also exact such promises.' 4
Subject to rate limitations imposed by usury statutes, an express
promise to pay simple interest is now everywhere enforcible. But the
way in which banks habitually perform their promises to pay interest on
the credit balance results in the payment of interest upon interest, a
consequence which is doubtless anticipated. If the payment of interest
upon interest is in pursuance of a prior bargain, it may be, because of
the doubt which still exists as to the enforcibility of such agreements,
that the bank will not be obligated to pay -it. With this in mind, the
practice of banks in respect of the payment of interest must be ex-
amined.
The basis for the computation of interest is the daily credit balance.
Whether or not the liability to honor the customer's orders is co-
1 See 2 WESTERFIELD, BANKING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1921) c. XXI;
SPAHR, CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS (1926) 110.
" See 3 WESTERFIELD, op. cit. 650; SPAHR, op. cit. 134, 416; 1 LA-rGSTON,
PRACTICAL BANK OPERATION (1921) 75-77. The constitution of the New York
Clearing House Association, Article XI, affects the payment of interest only on
domestic accounts (§ 3). For balances not subject to check and less than
$15,000 it fixes a maximum rate of 3 (§ 1) ; all others are subject to regula-
tion by the Clearing House Committee (§ 2),; the penalty for violations is a
$5,000 fine for the first offense, and expulsion for the second (§ 6).
Interest Ruling No. 5 illustrates a restriction on the permissible methods of
computing the amount on which interest may be paid. "Question: In cases
where member banks have an arrangement with correspondent banks to charge
to the correspondent's account, on the day forwarded, items sent them for
collection, is it permissible, under the rules, to allow interest on the amount of
items forwarded for the number of days required to convert the items into
cash, if they were deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank? Ruling: The Com-
mittee rules that the above practice may lead to abuses and violations of the
spirit of the amendment, and requests the members to adopt the plan of a delayed
charge in accordance with the time schedule of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, without allowance of interest or exchange."
" Article XI, § 4 of the New York Clearing House Constitution provides:
"No member of this Association, or bank or trust company or others clearing
through any member, shall pay exchange or other charges, or allow time, in
connection with the collection of any item collectible through the Federal Re-
serve Banks, but which is collected through other sources, in excess of the
charges which would have been payable or the time allowed had such item been
collected through the Federal Reserve Banks."
"' It is estimated by New York bankers that banks in the financial district,
whose customers are largely brokers, pay interest on most of their accounts.
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extensive in amount with the credit balance, it is clear that the amount
upon which interest is paid is not. That amount is determined as fol-
lows: to the balance at the close of the previous day are added all ad-
vances by the customer made during the day, and from this sum are sub-
tracted the advances by the bank made during the day and also an item
to compensate for "interest delays," arrived at by multiplying each of
the customer's advances by the number of days which will elapse before
the check or other item purchased by the bank can be collected. 15 Once
a month (in some banks once every three months) interest is computed
by multiplying by the agreed rate per month (i.e., the agreed annual
rate divided by 12) either the smallest "interest balance"shown on any
day during the period, or the average daily "interest balance" (i.e., the
sum of the actual daily "interest balances" divided by 30), or by multi-
plying by the agreed rate per day (i.e., the agreed annual rate divided
by 360) the sum of the products of each new "interest balance" and
the number of days it remained stationary. Obviously the first method
will yield a smaller total than the second and third; the latter two yield
the same result. The first is the common method used in computing
interest on "savings" accounts; the third is the English formula and is
used by American banks on foreign accounts; the second is the prevail-
ing American formula for domestic accounts. The sum of interest thus
arrived at is then credited to the customer's account.16 Two important
elements stand out from this practice; that the bank pays its interest
monthly, and that it pays its interest by crediting the customer's account.
The understanding between bank and customer, made when the account
was opened, compounded of words as to payment and these usages as
The following table, showing "a comparison of an interest balance with an




Actual balance as shown by ledger at beginning of day .. $75,000 $75,000
Deposited today:
Proceeds from discounts, loans, and other immediately
available items .................................... 25,000 25,000
Clearing house checks, country checks with exchange
trusts, etc., arriving too late to be collected today ......... 10,000
Country checks (discretionary, 3 days) .................... 5,000
$100,000 $115,000
Less checks paid .................................... 20,000 20,000
$80,00o $95,000
Less interest delay $5,000 at 2 days .................... 10,000 .....
Balance for today .............................. $70,000 $95,000
Balance forwarded to next day's work ............ $95,000 $95,000
"This account of banking practice is based on interviews and correspond-
ence with leading New York bankers.
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
to mode of payment, is for a periodic transformation of interest into
interest-bearing principal. It should be noted, however, that the under-
standing does not contain a promise, i.e., an assurance, to pay interest
upon interest. The understanding is not a bargain at all; it is rather
an agreement upon the terms of bargains to be made at the making of
each advance. Not until the making of each advance, viz., as part of
the bargain under which the advance is made, does the bank promise
to pay interest. When interest accrues and is not claimed by the cus-
tomer and becomes itself an advance, a bargain for the payment of
interest upon it is then consummated exactly as upon the making of
any other advance by customer to bank. Then for the first time the
bank promises to pay interest on interest. Thus the promise to pay
interest on interest is not made before the interest accrues. This dis-
tinction between understanding and promise, however available, may be
thought not potent enough to exorcise the demon of "compound" in-
terest. If the court should find that a bargain, and not an understand-
ing, for the payment of interest upon interest during the entire life of
the current account was made at the time of the original advance, will
an obligation to pay interest upon interest be imposed?
The English Chancellors refused to enforce an agreement made
before interest is payable to turn that interest, if not paid, into principal."'
Chancellor Kent, who transplanted the doctrine to America, was the
first to articulate reasons for it; he feared that to enforce such agree-
ments would be harsh and oppressive, and would tend to make debts
"accumulate with a rapidity beyond all ordinary calculation and endur-
ance."' 8 There was no pretense that the unenforcibility was the result
of statutory prohibitions of usury. 1 It is easy to see that the promise
ordinarily is not usurious.2 0  In the first place, the rate promised may
be so low or the occasions for turning interest into principal so infre-
quent that the aggregate of interest accruing during the life of the loan
will not exceed the aggregate resulting from a computation on the basis
of simple interest at the maximum permissible rate. But even if it
does, there is only one situation in which the promise is usurious:
"Ossulston v. Yarmouth, 2 Salk. 449 (1707); Ex parte Bevan, 9 Ves. Jr.
223 (1803). The result was that interest upon interest could not be collected.
However, the principal and simple interest -on the principal could be recovered,
and if interest on the interest was voluntarily paid it could not be recovered
back, see Mowry v. Bishop, 5 Paige 98, 103 .(N. Y. 1835). This is quite in con-
trast with the heavy penalties imposed by usury statutes, ranging in severity
from loss of the usurious interest, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 9331, to
forfeiture of the entire debt, Stat. 12 Anne, c. 16; N. Y. Gen. Business Law § 373.
'See Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13, 17 (N. Y. 1814).
"' See ibid. 20.
Of course, in jurisdictions where corporations are not permitted to plead
usury, ILL REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1924) c. 74, § 11; N. Y. Gen. Business Law § 374,
such a defense if it existed here would not be available to incorporated banks.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
when the borrower has no power to avoid the accumulation. For if
he is privileged under the agreement to pay the interest at the time set
for its becoming principal if it is not paid,21 and still more if he is under
a duty to pay it at that time, interest on the unpaid interest is not usuri-
ous.22 It is only where the compounding cannot be avoided, where it
is a method of computation rather than a method of fixing the date for
the payment of interest, that the agreement is usurious. 2 3 This single
case is impossible under the commercial bank's current account agree-
ment. It is always within its power to avoid the compounding by ten-
dering to the customer the amount of the credit balance. An additional
reason in the case of a current account coupled with a promise to honor
checks for judging that the bank's promise will be held not usurious is
the accepted rule governing the application of payments to an account
made up of principal and interest, which directs that payments shall be
applied first to discharge interest. 24  It is an uncommon checking ac-
count indeed in which the debits during any month do not exceed in
amount the credit for interest on credit balance which accrued the pre-
ceding month. The instances in such accounts in which that will not
be true and in which, consequently, interest will be paid on interest,
while common enough in the operation of "savings" current accounts,
are so rare that they should be judged not the end towards which
the parties bargained.2 5 The bargain therefore is not usurious.
As for the notion that an agreement before the interest is payable
to turn it into principal, though not usurious, should not be enforced,
whatever may have been its merits when applied to the English land-
owner of the eighteenth century, to the American settler, or to the con-
temporary petit bourgeois, it is surely inappropriate in the context we
are considering. Banks do not need protection against overreaching
by their customers, and protection against their own excessive eager-
ness to pay greater interest on deposits than is consistent with sound
banking had better be left to the clearing house associations. Further-
more, even if blinded Justice cannot see the distinction between banks
and other borrowers, the infrequency of occasions in which compound-
' Crider v, San Antonio Loan Ass'n, 89 Tex. 597, 35 S. W. 1047 (1896).
'Hochmark v. Richler, 16 Colo. 263, 26 Pac. 818 (1891) ; Bowman v. Neely,
137 Ill. 443, 27 N. E. 758 (1891) ; Ragan v. Day, 46 Iowa 239 (1877)_; Jones v.
Nossaman, 114 Kan. 886, 221 Pac. 271 (1923) ; Re Diven, 115 Kan. 119, 222 Pac.
106 (1924) ; Newton v. Woodley, 55 S. C. 132, 32 S. E. 531 (1898) ; Crider v. San
Antonio Loan Ass'n, 89 Tex. 597, 35 S. W. 1047 (1896). See Connecticut v.
Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13, 14 (N. Y. 1814); Hale v. Hale, 41 Tenn. 233, 235
(1860).
'See Crider v. San Antonio Loan Ass'n, 89 Tex. 597, 600, 35 S. W. 1047,
1048 (1896).
-Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13 (N. Y. 1814). See 33 C. J. 250, 251.
Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Waddell, 74 Ark. 241, 85 S. W. 417 (1905); Hatch
v. Douglas, 48 Conn. 116 (1880).
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
ing results on a checking account (because of the rule for the applica-
tion of payments) makes the bargain so unlikely to result in oppression
as to negative the conclusion that the promise was extorted by superi-
ority of bargaining'power. That the awarding to a bank of a privilege
or immunity to disregard its promise to pay interest by crediting it,
would be an empty gesture, is indicated by the fact that, notwithstand-
ing the long established practice of banks to make such promises, there
is no case in the books in which a bank has disputed a claim for interest
on the ground that it was compounded. Nevertheless, if the case should
arise, the probable result is by no means certain. The dictum of
Chancellor Kent is still echoing.
2 6
III
At the beginning of the discussion of interest upon interest it was
suggested that the behavior of bank and customer before interest ac-
crued amounted, first, to an understanding as to the terms of future
bargains and, secondly, to a series of such bargains, made upon each
advance by customer to bank, in which the bank promised to pay inter-
est on the credit balance including the particular advance. In conse-
quence, it was suggested that the bank did not promise to pay interest
on that interest until the interest accrued and became an advance on
the current account by customer to bank. In the argot this promise,
when made, because it is made after simple interest accrues, would be
called a "subsequent" agreement for compound interest. In content
this promise is quite different from that considered above, called an
'A promise in the loan agreement to pay compound interest is in nearly all
jurisdictions unenforcible, Ossulston v. Yarmouth, 2 Salk. 449 (1707) ; Ex parte
Bevan, 9 Ves. Jr. 223 (1803); Eslava v. Lepretre, 21 Ala. 504 (1852) ; Pauling
v. Creagh, 54 Ala. 646 (1875) semble; Breckenridge v. Brooks, 2 A. K. Marsh.
335 (Ky. 1820); Henry v. Flagg, 54 Mass. 64 (1847); Cox v. Smith, 1 Nev.
161 (1865); Connecticut. v. Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13 (N. Y. 1814) semble;
Catlin v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 44 (1844). Contra: Scott v. Saffold, 37 Ga. 384
'(1867) semble; Hale v. Hale, 41 Tenn. 233 (1860). But none of these cases
adjudicates the validity of such a promise in connection with a. current account.
For cases enforcing a customer's promise, and indicating a fortiori that the
bank's promise would be enforcible, see infra, note 43. Even a promise in the
loan agreement to pay simple interest on unpaid interest from the time of
default until payment, is in many states unenforcible. That it is enforcible,
Vaughan v. Kannan, 38 Ark. 114 (1881) ; Hovey v. Edmison, 3 Dak. 449 (1884) ;
Neel v. Young, 78 Ga. 342 (1886); Ellard v. Scottish-American Mtg. Co., 97
Ga. 329 (1895); Pawling v. Pawling, 4 Yeates 220 (Pa. 1805); Hale v. Hale,
41 Tenn. 233 (1860); Lewis v. Paschal, 37 Tex. 315 (1873). That it is not
enforcible, Hochmark v. Richler, 16 Colo. 263, 26 Pac. 818 (1891); Bowman v.
Neely, 137 Ill. 443, 27 N. E. 758 (1891) ; Niles v. Commissioners, 8 Blackf. 158
(Ind. 1846) ; Hoyle v. Page, 41 Mich. 533 (1879). See Connecticut v. Jackson, 1
Johns. Ch. 13, 14-17 (N. Y. 1814). In the latter group a familiar exception is
made in favor of "coupon notes," so that separate notes, themselves bearing
interest, given for interest on the principal obligation, are everywhere enforced.
Parker v. McGinty, 77 Colo. 458, 239 Pac. 10 (1925). See 37 A. L. R. 325, 344;
27 ibid. 81, 89.
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agreement "in advance." That promise was to pay interest on the prin-
cipal, and if the interest was not paid, to pay interest on the interest.
The "subsequent" agreement is to pay simple interest on a sum which
includes principal and accrued interest. The outcome of the two
promises is identical, but the fact that the latter is in terms a promise to
pay only simple interest has been seized upon as a point of distinction.
The "subsequent" agreement is, of course, not usurious,27 and has
always been enforcible everywhere.
28
An express agreement made after interest has accrued is no less
enforcible because it follows an unenforcible agreement made before
interest had accrued. And of course a subsequent agreement, like any
of the others we are considering, may be implied in fact as well as
express. The question arises whether, in the presence of an unen-
forcible agreement in advance, a new, subsequent, and therefore en-
forcible agreement may be found from acts which but for the unen-
forcibility of the prior agreement would be looked upon as done in
pursuance of the prior agreement and as nothing more. For example,
banks commonly render to their customers monthly statements showing
the credits and debits of the current account during the preceding
month and the balance at the end of the month. On an interest-bearing
account, the statement will show that the bank, in accordance with its
practice, has credited the account with the sum due for interest on the
credit balance. Now if a court should find, contrary to our suggestion,
that there was a bargain between bank and customer, before interest
accrued, and not merely an understanding, and furthermore that such
a bargain "in advance" was unenforcible, could it find that the render-
ing of the statement by the bank and the reliance upon it by the cus-
tomer amounted to a bargain that the balance on which interest was to
be calculated during the succeeding month should contain the item of
interest just accrued? Whether or not it would find such an agreement
depends, as does the existence of many implied-in-fact agreements,
upon whether or not it is desired to impose such an obligation as would
be imposed if an agreement in fact existed. The court's view as to the
social wisdom of regulating the payment of interest, as to the financial
'Jones v. Nossaman, 114 Kan. 886, 221 Pac. 271 (1923); Keiser v. Decker,
29 Neb. 92, 45 N. W. 272 (1890); Spain v. Talcott, 165 App. Div. 815, 152 N. Y.
Supp. 611 (1915). For cases holding such a promise by a customer not usurious,
see infra, note 44.
1Ossulston v. Yarmouth, 2 Salk. 449 (1707) semble; Bruce v. Hunter,
3 Campb. 467 (1814); Pauling v. Creagh, 54 Ala. 646 (1875); Wigton v. Elliott,
49 Colo. 115, 111 Pac. 713 (1910). See Ex parte Bevan, 9 Ves. Jr. 223, 224
(1883); Crosskill v. Bowes, 32 Beav. 86, 100 (1863) ; Van Benschooten v. Law-
son, 6 Johns. Ch. 313, 315 (N. Y. 1822). For cases enforcing such a promise
by a customer, and indicating a fortiori that the bank's promise would be
enforcible, see infra, note 44.
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
wisdom of banks' paying interest on checking accounts, as to the role
which favoritism, due, for example, to an official relation of customer
to bank, plays in the making of interest agreements, and if the bank is
insolvent, as to equality in distribution among those customers and
stockholders who have made contribution to the insolvent estate, would
probably be the determining factors.
If we are predicting the reaction of a court which, notwithstanding
its view that an unenforcible bargain for interest upon interest was
made when the account was opened, is prepared to find and enforce a
new bargain at the time of each advance of interest, basing its finding
upon the inclusion of interest in the credit balance and the reliance of
the customer on a statement rendered, there remains another situation-
of fact to be evaluated as a stimulus. Let it be supposed that interest
accruing on the credit balance during the first month of an account is
added to the credit balance at the end of that month but that no state-
ment is rendered and that there is no other basis for finding knowledge
and reliance by the customer. At the end of the second month a state-
ment is rendered and received. It indicates not only that interest which
accrued during the second month was added to the credit balance at
the end of that month, but also that the balance at the beginning of the
second month, with reference to which that interest was calculated,
included interest which accrued during the first mohth. The court would
then have before it facts from which could be implied what is called a
"subsequent retrospective" agreement. Here again Chancellor Kent's
voice is heard. Such an agreement, he said, was as unconscionable as
an agreement in advance. To exact, as the price of further forbearance,
an assent by the borrower to a calculation of interest in a manner for
which he had not contracted when he entered into the debt was harsh,
oppressive, and tended to usury.2 9 Why it is not actually usury is at
first hard to see. Since there was no promise in advance, or at least
no enforcible promise in advance, to pay interest on unpaid interest,
only simple interest grew on the principal, 30 or at most, in some juris-
dictions, simple interest on that interest,31 but certainly not interest
compounded periodically. If the borrower then, in return for a promise
'Van Benschooten v. Lawson, 6 Johns. Ch. 313 (N. Y. 1822).
'The rule in many states, denying interest as damages on defaulted interest,
Leonard v. Villars, 23 Ill. 377 (1860) ; Niles v. Commissioners, 8 Blackf. 158
(Ind. 1846); Grimes v. Blake, 16 Ind. 160 (1861);- Connecticut v. Jackson, 1
Johns. Ch. 13 (N. Y. 1814); Genin v. Ingersoll, 11 W. Va. 549 (1877); see
Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162, 167 (1876); is an exception to the rule allowing
interest as damages on defaulted obligations for the payment of money. See
supra, page 637 and note 8.
'Burke v. Trabue, 137 Ky. 580, 126 S. W. 125 (1910); Mann v. Cross,
9 Iowa, 327 (1859); Pierce v. Rowe, 1 N. H. 179 (1818); Kennon v. Dickens,
I Conf. 357 (N. C. 1800); Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 81 (1873); Roane v.
Ross, 84 Tex. 46, 19 S. W. 339 (1892) ; Catlin v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 44 (1844).
- 645
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by the lender to forbear suit on the amount at that time recoverable,
promises to pay that amount with interest at the maximum legal rate
on a greater amount, is not the promise usurious? A negative answer has
been based on the" argument that the greater sum (i.e., compound inter-
est to date) although not due at law, was "morally" due, and that it was
not usurious to promise to pay what was morally due.32 At any rate it
is admitted on all hands that the subsequent retrospective agreement
is not usurious.3 3 Then why is it "unconscionable"? No good reason
appears, certainly none in the case of bank and customer. Even in




In American commercial banking the credit balance represents the
normal state of the current account. Though the customer's indebted-
ness to the bank on his discounted notes exceed the indebtedness of the
bank to the customer, as is most often the case, the balance of the cur-
rent account is in favor of the customer. This is because the bank
buys the specific obligations of its customer in the form of notes and
bills for a price forthwith payable. The purchase of the paper is quite
independent of the current account. The transaction is not on the cur-
rent account until an advance is made, and when one is made it is an ad-
vance from customer to bank of the unpaid purchase price. A debit
balance exists only when the advances by the bank exceed all advances
of the customer including his advance of the unpaid purchase price of
his paper. The debit balance is an oddity, infrequent in occurrence and
short in duration. So firmly imbedded is the notion of the normality of
the credit balance and the abnormality of the debit balance that it has
colored even the terminology; debit balances are called "overdrafts."
Being unexpected, overdrafts are unsecured, and therefore have
come to be regarded as "forced loans" and generally disreputable. Of
course there is no reason why a bank may not agree to make advances
exceeding the amount of the credit balance. Some form of security,
e.g., bills of lading, corporate stocks or bonds, or personal guaranties,
may be arranged before the bank begins its advances to the customer.
Camp v. Bates, 11 Conn. 487 (1836); Mowry v. Bishop, 5 Paige 98 (N. Y.
1835).
'Camp v. Bates, 11 Conn. 487 (1836); Gilmore v. Bissell, 124 Ill. 488
(1888) ; Breed v. Baird, 139 Ill. App. 15 (1907) ; Sanford v. Lundquist, 80 Neb.
414, 118 N. W. 129 (1907); Kellogg v. Hickok, 1 Wend. 521 (N. Y. 1828);
Stewart v. Petree, 55 N. Y. 621 (1874) ; Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876)
semble; Parham v. Pulliam, 45 Tenn. 497 (1868).
"Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876), current account between principal and
agent; Neuberger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219 N. Y. 505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916),
current account between finance company and customer.
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
In no respect would such an agreement .be inferior in dignity to an
extension of bank credit by means of a loan or discount. Such is the
established British and British colonial practice. 5 But the American
banks, except in the case of foreign accounts, 36 do not extend credit
by means of overdrafts. There is, to be sure, one relevant difference
in result between the American and British systems which may account
for the attachment of American bankers to their own. It is that under
the American system the customer pays interest on his note at the
'In Scotland, where in 1730 the overdraft as a conventional form of the
extension of bank credit seems to have had its birth, it is known as a cash
credit. Ajoint and several bond is executed by the customer and two caution-
ers binding them to repay on demand with interest the amount of any over-
draft to the limit agreed upon. The bank will revoke its offer if the overdraft
becomes a dead loan; but the offer may be outstanding for years if the bank
does not become dissastisfied with the bondsmen or they do not withdraw from
the obligation.' It seems that the Scottish gystem grew out of a desire on the
part of the Scottish banks to dispose of superfluous credit in the form of their
bank notes. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) Bk. 11, c. 2 (Selig-
man's ed. 1910, 263 et seq.); 1 HUME, ESSAYS, Essay on Balance of Trade
(Green & Grose ed. 1875) 339 (". . . one of the most ingenious ideas that has
been executed in commerce"). It is said that to the cash credit system is due
largely the growth of the Scottish agricultural and middle classes and the pos-
sibility of the rise of propertyless individuals who cannot afford to pay interest
on loans or risk their repayment. The advantage to the bank is in the form
of the higher rate of interest demanded, the interest being computed on daily
balances, see GILDART, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF BANKING (1870) 129-134,
506-511; MAcLEOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BANKING (1911) 344-351; JOHN-
STON, Scottish Banking System, PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN BANKERS Ass'-N 28TH
ANNUAL CONVENTION (1902) 75, 78; SPALDING, BANKERS' CREDITS (1921) 9 et
seq.; Interviews on Banking, 1 REPORT NAT. MONETARY COMMISSION (1911) 135,
150, 165; WITHERS, THE ENGLISH BANKING SYSTEM (1910) 42. In India, it is
customary to give a demand note for the maximum of the overdraft allowed
with the surety as accommodation maker and the customer as payee-indorser.
The Australian practice is described in HAMILTON, LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANK-
ING IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (2d ed. 1900) 150-179; and see, e.g., Bank
of Victoria v. Brown [1875] 1 Vict. L. R. (law) 47. In England, overdrafts
were formerly used extensively only in the country, DAVIS, BANK ORGANIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT (1910) 94; GIIBART, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF BANKING
(1870) 174, 399; but they are becoming increasingly common and loans on notes
(taken as security) corresponding less common. In 1911 the Bank of England
reported that its practice was to allow no overdrafts, see Interviews on Banking,
supra, 234. By 1919 it was reported that the five big joint-stock banks made ad-
vances in the form of agreed-to overdrafts amounting," in the case of at least
one bank, to about one-fifth of the number of loans but much more in the vol-
ume of credit since it is used most extensively by the very large firms. The
practice is to place securities in the bank which serve against both loans and
overdrafts. The limit fixed is generally approximate and the exact sum is left
to the requirements of the firm. The customer fills out a form or signs his
account as an acknowledgment and though the date when the customer expects
to pay must be stated large firms have heavy overdrafts almost continuously.
GRADY, Use of the Trade Acceptance in British Domestic Business, COMMERCE
REPORTS (July 22, 1919) No. 170, 417-418. At the present writing, correspond-
ence and interviews with persons acquainted with English banking practice in-
dicate that the agreed-to overdraft is even much more common today than in
1919; but there exists an opinion that in spite of the fact that the rate of in-
terest is somewhat higher than the daily bank rate the banks will tend to dis-
courage overdrafts and prefer to lend agreed sums for agreed periods.
12 LANGSTON, PRACTICAL BANK OPERATION (1921) 565.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
agreed rate for the agreed time no matter how little of its proceeds he
may actually use (as shown by the size of his credit balance in the
meantime), while under the British practice, the amount on which he
pays interest does not exceed the bank's advances.
Since the debit balance is abnormal in the United States, we do
not find formal agreements between customer and banker for the pay-
ment of interest by the customer on debit balances. Not being con-
templated, the contingency is not provided for. In many jurisdictions
there is no obligation to pay interest on a loan unless interest is in! terms
bargained for.3 7 In them there is no obligation upon the customer to
pay interest on debit balances if they do occur.38 However, in states
where an obligation to pay interest on a loan is built upon the presump-
tion of interest on a loan,3 9 the customer may be obligated.4 0 Certainly
the presumption is not rebutted, as it is in the case of the credit balance.
The customer's obligation to pay a debit balance, unlike the bank's
obligation to pay a credit balance, does not result from a bargain for the
"purchase" by the customer of deposit currency. But if there is a
bargain for interest, in terms or by presumption, what is its content as
to time and mode of payment?
If there is a bargain in terms, as in Great Britain and the British
Colonies, there is usually a writing containing a promise to pay interest,
which together with the banking practice of debiting interest, results in
a bargain to pay interest on the debit balance periodically by adding it
to the debit balance. 41 If there is no bargain in terms, the obligation,
if there is one, is said to rest upon the presumption of a promise. Doubt-
less in constructing the presumed promise in the process of formulating
the obligation, the courts will piece the promise together out of English
practice and American practice in respect of foreign accounts. The
promise, then, will be said to be one to pay interest periodically by
debiting it.
Whether the bargain is in terms or presumed, probably the same
question as to the time of its making will be posed as that discussed in
connection with the bargain for interest upon interest on the credit bal-
ance. Is the bargain made at the time of opening the account? Is it
made at the time the bank makes its advance, i.e., at the time interest
becomes due? A finding that the bargain is made when interest becomes
due and is debited opens wide the door to the court disposed to impose
' See cases cited supra, note 8.
Hubbard v. Charlestown R. R., 52 Mass. 124 (1846).
"See supra, note 6.
40 Casey v. Carver, 42 Ill. 225 (1866) semble.
'National Bank of New Zealand v. Grace, 8 N. Z. L. R. 706 (1890) ; Moore
v. Voughton, 1 Stark. 487 (1816) semble.
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INTEREST ON CHECKING ACCOUNTS
an obligation to pay interest upon interest.42  Even a finding fixing its
date at the opening of the account by no means closes the door.4 3
The court which can see no bargain for interest upon interest ex-
cept in the rendering of a statement, or which, doubting the validity of a
prior agreement, relies upon the statement, can put the case into the






'A bargain at the time the interest is debited that the customer shall pay
the bank interest upon interest included in the debit balance is obligatory. See
the cases cited infra, note 44, holding that an agreement subsequent to the
debiting, e.g., at the time of rendering a statement, is not usurious and is en-
forcible.
A bargain between bank and customer said to be made when the account
is opened is not usurious, First Nat. Bank v. Waddell, 74 Ark. 241, 85 S. W.
4175(1905); Hillsboro Oil Co. v. Citizens' N'at. Bank, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 610,
75 . W. 336 (1903); and is enforcible, Stewart v. Stewart, L. R. 27 Ir. 351
(1891) ; McLeod v. Nat. Bank of New Zealand, 6 N. Z. L. R. 3 (1888) ; National
Bank of New Zealand v. Grace, 8 N. Z. L. R. 706 (1890) ; Parr's Banking Co. v.
Yates [1898] 2 Q. B. 460, semble. But see, Montgomery v. Ryan, 9 Ont. 572,
584 (1907).
Accord: Hatch v. Douglas, 48 Conn. 116 (1880) stockbroker's account, not
usurious; McManus v. Sawyer, 231 Fed. 231 (S. D. N'. Y. 1915) finance com-
pany's account, enforcible. Contra: Neuberger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219 N. Y.
505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916); and Lemnos Silk Works v. Spiegelberg, 217 N. Y.
Supp. 595 (1926) finance company account unenforcible though not usurious.
"A "subsequent" agreement found from the rendering of a statement by
bank to customer is not usurious, Caliot v. Walker, 2 Anstr. 495 (1794) ; Timber-
lake v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Fed. 231 (C. C. Miss. 1890) ; and is enforcible, Hari-
das Ranchordas v. Mercantile Bank of India, 44 Bombay 474 (1919) ; Clancarty
v. Latouche, 1 Ball & B. 420 (1810) ; Eaton v. Bell, 5 B. & Ald. 34 (1821) ; Ruf-
ford v. Bishop, 5 Russ. Ch. 346 (1829); Williamson v. Williamson, 7 Eq. Cas.
542 (1869) ; Isett v. Oglevie, 9 Iowa, 313 (1859). Contra: Montgomery v. Ryan,
9 Ont. 572 (1907) semble. There are no cases of "subsequent retrospective"
agreements.
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